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Abstract—Private messaging over internet related services is
difficult to implement. Regular end-to-end encryption messaging
systems are prone to man in the middle attacks and only hide
messages but not the identity of its users. For example, WhatsApp
offers a strong privacy guarantee but does not hide much
Metadata because it uses end-to-end encryption. Other messaging
systems such as Skype can be monitored by government agencies
and have backdoors implemented into its software.
Zephyr is an anonymous messaging system that protects the
privacy of message contents and message metadata. Users that
use Zephyr do not reveal who they are talking to or the contents
of their messages. The goal of Zephyr is to decrease the amount
of information being sent by the user and hide as much metadata
as possible.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most private messaging systems today rely on an end-to-
end encryption scheme and do not do a good job at hiding
metadata. Metadata is all an adversary needs to figure out
your identity and other personal information. As a result
of electronic surveillance of private communication systems
many private messaging systems will be end-to-end encrypted
or offer some kind of security. The security that they offer is
no more than a basic system sprinkled with ”encryption dust”.
For example, a simple communication channel with public
key encryption. Encryption alone is not enough to guarantee a
secure system. A true secure system is designed for security.
Other private messaging systems such as Tor are a step
forward in ensuring privacy but are still not reliable. A user of
Tor can have their identity compromised by the use of traffic
analysis [1]. Tor relies on a large amount of users to ensure
privacy. Cover traffic can be used to hide the users identity
but is very expensive and only offers limited protection [2].
Messaging systems that offer a ”self destruct” feature which
destroys messages for both users ,such as Telegram still don’t
ensure much privacy because the data can be recovered with
the use of computer forensic tools.
This paper presents Zephyr, a system that provides private
messaging but hides as much metadata as possible. Zephyr
does not rely on a large amount of users to ensure privacy:
only two users are needed to ensure an adversary will not
be able to figure out the identity of the users. The system’s
security is not dependant on the amount of users.
Zephyr uses a mixnet that hides metadata by routing
messages though multiple servers. Each server shuffles its
messages using a random permutation and operates on a small
amount of variables from the user to hide as much metadata
as possible.
To communicate with other users Zephyr utilizes identity-
based encryption. Users only need to know the email address
of the other user they wish to talk to. The public key of
the recipient is computed with the recipients email address
and a master public key [3]. Identity-based encryption allows
Zephyr to compute a recipient’s public key without revealing
the recipient’s identity.
Zephyr is a synchronous algorithm and at the end of
every round of exchanging messages the users messages are
uploaded to mailbox servers. These mailboxes can be shared
by many different users. Each user will download all the
contents of her mailbox and attempt to decrypt every single
message until the intended message is found.
After uploading messages to the mail boxes, Zephyr deletes
all the keys used for encryption in the system and new keys
are generated. A new master public key and master private key
will be generated, thus, the keys for all Zephyr’s users. The
keys for each mixnet server are also regenerated. A prototype
of Zephyr written in C++ can be found here https://github.com/
MutexUnlocked/congenial-zephyr and cryptography utilities
here https://github.com/MutexUnlocked/crypto.
Algorithm 1 Typical Zephyr life cycle
The user receives the public keys of many different mixnet
servers and encrypts the message first with the recipient’s
public key. The user then encrypts the message again using
another mixer’s public key. The encryption process is
continued until every mixer public key has been used,
forming encapsulated layers of encryption. The first mixer
server that the user chooses at random for encryption will be
responsible for uploading the files to its appropriate mailbox.
1) Shuffle: A mixer receives messages (M1, . . . ,Mn) and
generates a random permutation p. The mixer then
encrypts the messages shuffles them using p and sends
them though a stream to the next mixer server.
2) Decrypt: The shuffling process continues until a server
s is the last to begin shuffling. Once this happens s will
notify all the other servers in the system and decryption
will begin.
3) Upload: Server s (the user chosen server) receives
(M1, . . . ,Mn) and uploads each to their appropriate
mailbox.
At the end of the round a new coordinator will be picked
and keys will be regenerated. All nodes will download the
new public-key data.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Cryptographic Primitives
Zephyr exploits two cryptographic primitives which are
described here.
a) Identity Based Encryption: Zephyr uses the Boneh-
Franklin Identity-Based encryption scheme [3], which consists
of the following algorithms:
• Setup: This algorithm is run by the PKG and generates
a master public and private key. The master public key
is made public.
• Extract: This algorithm will be run by the PKG when
a user wants to request her private key. The PKG will
authenticate users by sending an authentication code to
their emails.
• Encrypt: Users will take the master public key and use
it to generate the recipient’s public key and encrypt the
given message and create a ciphertext.
• Decrypt: The recipient will user her private key that the
PKG generated with its master private key and decrypt
the message.
b) XSalsa20 Authenticated Encryption: Zephyr also ex-
ploits XSalsa20: a stream cipher based on Salsa20 that uses a
192-bit nonce instead of a 64-bit one found in its predecessor.
XSalsa20 is ”immune to timing attacks and provides its own
64-bit block counter to avoid incrementing the nonce after each
block” [6]. Each mixnet server and user in Zephyr exploits this
encryption scheme.
c) Modification: Zephyr modifies the Boneh-Franklin
Identity-Based encryption scheme to encrypt the message
contents of recipients. The Boneh-Franklin encryption scheme
is used to encrypt the message digest of the message using
the recipients public key. The message digest is used as the
key for secret key encryption that encrypts the message. The
encrypted message, nonce, and encrypted message digest are
then serialized and sent to a mixer.
B. Interprocess Communication
Mixnet servers in Zephyr rely on remote procedure calls
(RPC) to communicate with each other. RPCs allow Zephyr
to execute a procedure in a different address space as if it
were a local procedure call, for example, the address space
of another mixer node. To make things simple image you
calling your Mom to make muffins but instead you tell her
the ingredients. When she is done she gives you the muffins.
Each mixnet server contains a RPC server and a RPC client.
Essentially, making the mixnet servers have a peer-to-peer
model. Each mixnet server executes the server and client code
asynchronously.
To distribute public keys among other mixer nodes Zephyr
relies on a distributed hash table. Distributed hash tables
(DHTs) are a distributed database where data can be retrieved
with keys. Just like a regular hash table a DHT has a key
associated with every value. DHT nodes coordinate themselves
to store data. In particular, Zephyr makes use of the Kademlia
DHT. The rest of this section will describe its properties.
Kademlia is a distributed hash table and lookup system [4]
where a virtual network is formed with participating nodes. To
decrease timeout delays Kademlia uses asynchronous queries
just in case a node is a straggler or just failed. Like many other
peer-to-peer systems keys are SHA-1 hashes of data. Distance
between nodes and key locations in Kademlia is calculated
using XOR (exclusive or). For exmaple, the distance between
two nodes it calculated as nodeID1 XOR nodeID2. Similarly,
the distance between a node and a store pair is calculated with
nodeID XOR Key. The (Key,Value) pairs reside on the node
with an ID that is closest to it (the smallest XOR distance).
C. Serialization
Objects in Zephyr are serialized and deserialized using a
header only C++ library called Cereal [5]. Cereal is capable
of serializing data in many different formats JSON, XML, etc.
Zephyr serializes objects to binary data in a way that endian-
ness is preserved across different architectures. The parameters
for the Identity-Based encryption scheme are serialized using
Cereal.
The public-key generator for the Identity-Based encryption
scheme in Zephyr uses websockets to transmit data. For
WebSocket communications, data must be UTF-8 encoded to
be used over the wire for textual data (most Internet protocols
use UTF-8) [7]. The parameters for IBE in Zephyr are not
UTF-8 encoded. To be able to transmit these parameters to
clients Zephyr relies on Cereal to create binary output data.
Fig. 1. Peer-to-peer model of Mixnet
The contents of messages are serialized using a library for
binary serialization in C++ [8]. Then contents of the messages
are sent to their corresponding recipients over websockets and
are deserialized.
III. OVERALL DESIGN
To use Zephyr the applications developer will need to build
the shared library from the source code and setup required
servers mixers, mailboxes, etc. The library also contains the
client code.
To begin users use their email addresses and generate their
public and private keys. The private key generator (PKG) is
Fig. 2. Private-key generator and user authentication
responsible for private key generation. Before the PKG can
give the user its private key it must make sure that the user
is honest. So some form of authentication must take place.
To achieve this Zephyr’s PKGs authenticate users via email.
A unique code is sent to the email and users are required to
send that code to the PKG. The downside of this is that if the
user’s email is compromised by an adversary then the attacker
will be able to claim the user’s identity.
Once the user has proved to the PKG that it is she who
is requesting the public and private keys, she will generate
the public key for her recipient Kr. After the Kr has been
generated she will encrypt her message with Kr forming
Kr(message). Next the user will select a random mixer server
to use as the last layer of mixer encryption and other random
mixer servers to use as other layers of encryption. The address
of the next mixer will be appended to each new ciphertext, but
the last layer of encryption will have a mailbox address instead
of a mixer address.
The resulting ciphertext may look something like this:
Km(address,Km(address,Kr(message)))
A random permutation for mixer servers p will be chosen with
every message sent by the user.
Mixers will be constantly listening for messages in the
background. Once they have received the message they decrypt
it with their key
A. Threat Model
Zephyr’s deployment consist of hundreds to thousands of
servers, owned by a single individual or an organization. Every
user in the system will agree on a set of participating servers.
Zephyr assumes that all of its traffic is being monitored by
some adversary and that adversary controls all but one mixnet
server. However, such an adversary is unrealistic in practice
[9]. If Zephyr is widely distributed over a large geographical
area such a passive adversary is unlikely to exist. For example,
a government may take control of a few Internet service
providers (ISPs) and use them to monitor Zephyr’s traffic,
but if Zephyr is distributed among several countries it will
be harder for the government to obtain access to the foreign
ISPs needed to monitor Zephyr.
Zephyr also assumes that internal adversaries participate
in the network, for example, a node or client. Mixer nodes
are a potential target because once they are compromised the
anonymity of Zephyr’s clients are broken. One mixnet server
is all that is needed to ensure privacy.
Zephyr’s model contains a central authority that coordinates
the actions of the system. If the coordinator fails a mixnet
server in the system has the opportunity to become a coor-
dinator. Once the round is over and the original coordinator
recovers. The mixnet server that took its role will be reverted
to a traditional mixnet server.
a) Substitution Attacks: Compromised mixers may have
their original public keys substituted with a malicious client’s
public key. So when a mixer attempts to decrypt a message
the malicious client will be able to read the contents of
the message. Furthermore, the adversary that compromised
the mixer may not have substitute her private key with the
mixers private key but only substituted her public key for the
mixers, therefore, making the message unable to decrypt and
disrupting the whole mixnet.
b) Denial-of-service attacks: Zephyr is resistant to Dos
attacks because of its use of Kademila based DHTs to store
data between its nodes. If some nodes become unavailable
Kademila will simply find a route around the unavailable
nodes.
B. Mixer Nodes
As noted earlier mixer nodes are responsible for encrypting
and decrypting client messages. Zephyr’s mixnet is a free route
topology, so a unique permutation of mixers for messages to
pass through is chosen for each client. The order of mixers
is determined by a FisherYates shuffle, which generates the
random permutation.
During each round mixers will receive multiple streams
of client messages through RPC. They will then decrypt the
message and send them to the correct mixer. The last mixer in
the chain will upload the ciphertext into its respective mailbox.
Mixers communicate with each other using a DHT and RPC.
Mixers do not start decrypting messages until all other mixers
in the network are ready. Once a mixer is ready it will store
a value in the DHT telling all other nodes that it is ready.
A mixer will know if all the other nodes are ready when it
receives a certain number of values from a specific key. For
example, if the key readytomix has ten values and there are
ten mixers then mixing will begin.
C. Information Nodes
Zephyr also takes advantage of information nodes (info-
nodes) to decrease the overhead of the mixers. All mixers
know each others public key, however, sending the public keys
of all mixers to each client would be costly. Instead mixers
send their public keys to info nodes, and the info-nodes send
their received keys to other info nodes using a DHT. Finally,
the clients select an info-node at random to download the
public key for each mixer.
Fig. 3. Mixers give data to info-notes
D. Mailboxes
Mailboxes are the final destination for client messages. Each
client shares its mailbox with other clients. Mailboxes are
selected when the client connect to Zephyr using a pseudo-
random number generator. At the end of each round the client
will download the whole mailbox and attempt to decrypt each
one until it has found its intended message.
Mailboxes are SQL databases. The database will have a
specific column for each mailbox and clients will download
their whole column. Mailboxes can also have their SQL
databases stored in memory, depending on the amount of RAM
of the system, to increase read and write speeds. In certain
circumstances, Zephyr might store the database in memory, for
example, there are a few clients but a lot of available memory.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To test the performance of Zephyr it was run on a local area
network (LAN). The test environment had servers with 2 Intel
Xeon E5-2673 v3 CPU cores, 8 GB of RAM, and 10 Gbps of
network bandwidth. The servers were installed with Ubuntu
Server 18.04. Zephyr components were run on several Docker
containers inside each server. User clients also ran inside a
few docker containers. All Zephyr’s servers were run on the
same private network in the same data center.
A. Performance
Performance data was collected using Docker’s resource
usage statistics. The average memory usage and data received
over the network interface were measured for the public-key
generators and mixers. Be aware that the number of clients
in each graph is not the amount of clients in Zephyr but the
number of clients that connected to each server (clients don’t
use every PKG or info-node).
1) Public-key Generator: The PKG server used the most
amount of system resources out of all the other servers in
Zephyr. The PKG used around 55 megabytes of memory to do
its computations. The memory does not seem to grow relative
to the amount of clients because memory is being used and
freed when each client requests her public-key. However, if
multiple clients access the PKG at the same time the memory
usage will dramatically increase. Most of the PKG’s memory
is used for cryptographic functions, such as computing the
public keys of clients. The data sent over the network interface
for the PKG grows almost proportionally to the amount of
clients.
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2) Mixers: Mixers consumed less system resources com-
pared to the PKGs. The average amount of memory consumed
by each mixer increased with the amount of clients in the
beginning but leveled off in the end. The amount of bytes
received increased as the number of clients increased and it is
expected that the bytes received grows almost proportionally
to the number of clients. The bytes received by each mixer in-
cludes messages from clients and other mixers. The number of
bytes could also vary because of the message sizes, however,
in this experiment all message sizes were constant.
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3) Info-nodes: The info-nodes consumed an amount of sys-
tem resources that were very similar to average mixer system
resources consumption. This is because mixers and info-nodes
have similar implementations. For example, they both make
use of the Kademila DHT for sharing data. However, info-
nodes do not decrypt ciphertext and send them to other servers.
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V. LIMITATIONS
All the servers that run Zephyr are limited to a private
network because they all consists of Docker containers. Us-
ing docker containers with Zephyr increases the number of
components but makes it harder to traverse the NAT (network
address translation). Zephyr’s current implementation is unable
to do such a thing. Zephyr may have to be implemented with
UDP hole punching [10] or the ICE protocol.
VI. CONCLUSION
Zephyr makes private messaging over internet related ser-
vices easier to implement and does not rely on regular end-
to-end encryption messaging systems, which are prone to man
in the middle attacks. Zephyr hides users identities by using
private key generators, mailboxes, and a mixnet. Users that use
Zephyr do not reveal who they are talking to or the contents
of their messages.
VII. FUTURE WORK
Because Zephyr is not computational expensive to run
Zephyr will also be extended to run on embedded systems.
Due to Zephyr’s simplicity it will be tested as an extension to
other messaging systems.
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